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LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CON-
STITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. Ellen Frankel Pault 
and Howard Dickman,2 eds. Albany: State Univ. of New 
York Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 340. Cloth, $65.50; paper, $21.95. 
JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLmCS: THE 
ANATOMY OF LOCHNER v. NEW YORK. By Paul 
Kens.3 Lawrence, KS.: Univ. Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. 
232. Cloth, $29.95. 
Herbert Hovenkamp4 
These two volumes offer new perspectives on a familiar topic in 
constitutional history and theory. The first volume is a collection of 
essays about the proper scope of constitutional protection of eco-
nomic liberties. The second is a long-needed historical study of the 
decision that has been treated as epitomizing the Supreme Court's 
position on these rights during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era: 
Lochner v. New York (1905). 
The essays in the Paul-Dickman volume are well balanced, 
with perspectives from right, left, and center-and, pleasantly, with 
authors who actually engage one another in debate. James M. 
Buchanan's essay on "The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberi-
alism" states what has become a kind of constitutional orthodoxy 
for the judicial activist new right: the property and due process 
clauses of the Constitution should be interpreted to protect eco-
nomic rights, and these rights are best given effect in a regime of 
free exchange. Voluntary exchanges are a product of unanimous 
consent, and injure no one provided there are no third party effects. 
This is the kind of regime, Buchanan argues, that people operating 
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would adopt, for it maximizes 
both efficiency and human freedom. This suggests to Buchanan 
that such institutions as labor unions are bad (he does not exactly 
say that they are unconstitutional) because they prevent laborers 
from bargaining individually for wages and force them to accept the 
I. Professor of Political Science, Bowling Green State University; Deputy Director, 
Social Philosophy and Policy Center. 
2. Research Associate, Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State 
University. 
3. Assistant Professor, Political Science, Southwest Texas State University. 
4. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
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bargain of the collective. In addition, nothing forces the union 
members to share their gains with those laborers who become un-
employed as a result of the general wage increase. People operating 
behind a veil of ignorance, Buchanan asserts, would not select such 
a bargaining regime. Buchanan does not address the fact that busi-
ness firms are largely collectives, formally treated as persons by the 
law of corporations. A labor union could organize as a corporation, 
with each shareholder pledged to sell her labor to the corporation, 
which would in tum sell it to any employer at a uniform price. Pre-
sumably, Buchanan would proclaim such an arrangement a subter-
fuge. But the individual stockholders in a large manufacturing 
corporation are in an analogous position on the other side of the 
table. 
Mark Tushnet follows with a radically different perspective on 
the relationship between property and the Constitution. He begins 
with a point that has been made before but is worth making again: 
the theory of regulatory "capture," now the darling of the public 
choice schools, was really a creation of the Left, not the Right. Fur-
ther, not even the Constitution itself is exempt. In the case of the 
Constitution, the theory of regulatory capture derives, of course, 
from Charles Beard's controversial Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution (1913 ). The citation to Beard suggests an important 
point that Tushnet himself fails to make: any argument that one 
should use the Constitution to protect property owners from legisla-
tures captured by special interest groups must consider that the 
Constitution itself was the product of a kind of capture. The reason 
we have the contract clause and the takings clause in the first place, 
Beard argued, was that the Constitutional Convention was domi-
nated by property holders and creditors rather than the unproper-
tied and debtors. Owners of securities from public debts incurred 
during and after the Revolution and private creditors who feared 
state debtor relief laws wanted strong protection of both contract 
and property. They controlled the drafting and ratification 
processes. The unpropertied, by contrast, were not permitted to 
vote by the ratifying states and generally were not qualified to be 
delegates or to participate in the ratifying conventions. Those who 
would interpret special interest legislation narrowly should practice 
what they preach when they interpret the Constitution itself. 
Lino Graglia's essay attacking "Judicial Activism of the 
Right" is by far the angriest in this volume, but it is also compel-
ling. Graglia has no respect for Warren Era liberals, particularly 
Justice Brennan, who freely used their own ideology rather than the 
Constitution itself as the source of constitutional rights. But con-
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servative noninterpretivists such as Richard Epstein are equally 
wrongheaded, he argues, when they rewrite the contract clause, the 
takings clause, and other clauses in order to protect a more expan-
sive concept of economic rights from legislative encroachment. On 
judicial review, Graglia's position is most like that of Holmes or 
James Bradley Thayer,s who would invalidate legislation only 
where the constitutional language was clearly inconsistent with the 
language of the statute or rule under consideration. 
Stephen Macedo disagrees with both Graglia and Epstein in 
"Economic Liberties and the Future of Constitutional Self-Govern-
ment." Unlike Graglia, he favors relatively expansive judicial re-
view for the protection of property and contract rights. But he 
faults Epstein's analysis as too explicitly economic, and "only 
vaguely derived" from the text of the Constitution. More impor-
tantly, Macedo argues, Epstein devotes his attention to a few 
clauses of the Constitution (commerce, contract, takings) and never 
really attempts to interpret the text as a whole. "[O]nce one begins 
interpreting parts of the Constitution in terms of the whole, includ-
ing its broad language and implicit ends and purposes, it becomes 
harder to find bright lines and clear rules." It particularly becomes 
"difficult to justify the blanket judgment" of Epstein's book on Tak-
ings 6 "that all transfers are, in principle, unconstitutional." 
Frank Michelman then argues in "Tutelary Jurisprudence and 
Constitutional Property" that the constitutional perspective on 
property rights is far more malleable and indeterminate than the 
Right would have us believe. Credible arguments can be made for 
both a republican constitutional vision, which looks to the popular 
will, and a liberal vision, which regards persons as having absolute, 
or "pre-political," rights. Likewise, the line between traditional 
"negative" property rights, such as the right to exclude the world or 
to use one's property for one's own benefit, and newer "positive" 
rights, such as welfare entitlements, is not demarcated with any pre-
cision. "[O]ne simply can't, at least not while thinking or talking as 
an insider to American constitutionalism, quite abandon either pole 
of the liberal/republican axis." Even if one could, that "would 
leave unresolved the problem of negative-vs.-affi.rmative rights." 
Epstein responds to Graglia, Macedo, and Michelman in "Tak-
ings: Of Maginot Lines and Constitutional Compromises." But the 
brunt of his attack goes against Graglia, whom he accuses of criti-
5. Eg., Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
6. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985). 
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cizing all common uses of judicial review without offering any sub-
stitute theory of his own. He thinks it naive of Graglia to argue that 
one must conduct judicial review without the benefit of political 
theory. The plain language of the Constitution simply does not an-
swer every question, and interpretation and theory are necessary to 
fill in the gaps. 
Although Graglia's position is simple, it may be more subtle 
than Epstein acknowledges. Graglia argued that in those cases 
where the Constitution's meaning must be "filled in" and more than 
one interpretation is rational, it is for legislators, not judges, to 
choose among the interpretations. To be sure Graglia's view would 
roll back judicial review a century, to the pre-Lochner period, but 
his position was in fact quite respectable for some time in the mid-
dle decades of the nineteenth century: the Constitution's more gen-
eral or hortatory clauses-such as due process, takings, and free 
exercise-may have many meanings depending on one's ideology. 
In such cases, Graglia argued, the judge's duty is to permit the leg-
islature to interpret the Constitution. 
In a short essay on "Civil Rights and Property Rights," Wil-
liam H. Riker argues in somewhat idiosyncratic fashion that the 
Supreme Court's elevation of civil rights over property rights is in-
defensible. In fact, the two kinds of rights have similar origins and 
functions in classical liberal political theory. Riker's point may be 
provable, but probably not by the method he chose. Riker simply 
takes a few examples of rights-free speech as a civil right and air-
port landing slots as a property right-and provides a brief 
thumbnail history of each, designed to show that the rights devel-
oped through a bargaining process involving self-interested grantors 
and grantees. But these three pages of history, citing only a few 
sources, certainly do not prove that "civil and property rights origi-
nate in the persistent demands of potential beneficiaries, and in the 
calculations of granting officials that satisfying petitioners is less 
costly than resisting them," or that "civil and property rights have 
historically similar origins." A "public choice" constitutional his-
tory remains to be written. 
In "The Politics of the New Property: Welfare Rights in Con-
gress and the Courts," R. Shep Melnick argues that although the 
Court's creation of federal welfare rights, particularly under 
AFDC, was superficially a result of statutory construction, the 
Court's interpretations actually related only loosely to the language 
and congressional intent of those statutes. This explains why the 
Reagan administration was forced to cut back, in particular by re-
storing to the states the power to determine eligibility individually. 
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The final two essays in this volume concern labor. In "Work, 
Government, and the Constitution: Determining the Proper Allo-
cation of Rights and Power," Thomas R. Haggard traces the his-
tory of Supreme Court supervision of the employer-employee 
relationship for more than a century. Haggard finds his own his-
tory to be inconclusive, but observes that the Court seems to have 
moved from a rather clearly defined natural rights premise during 
the Lochner era at the tum of the century to a much more prag-
matic, situational position today. But more importantly, Haggard 
argues, the Supreme Court has always played super-legislature on 
the subject of employee rights. The criticisms of the Lochner-era 
Court for substituting its own judgments for those of the legisla-
tures whose statutes it struck down were certainly well founded. 
But what the Court has done since the New Deal is, in this respect 
no different. Finally, Leo Troy argues in "The Right to Organize 
Meets the Market" that the New Deal and post-New Deal judicial 
effort to shift bargaining power toward labor unions has failed, not 
because of legislation, but because the market itself has deprived the 
unions of their powerful position. The power of private sector un-
ions has declined substantially since the 1970s. Public sector unions 
have not generally met the same fate, for public leaders are not "ac-
countable" for higher labor costs in the same way that competitive 
firms are. 
Paul Kens's book on Lochner attempts to be a comprehensive 
history of the famous case. He gives a lively account of working 
conditions in New York bakeries and of the legislative battle that 
produced the Lochner statute. Perhaps the statute, which pre-
vented bakers from working more than sixty hours weekly or ten 
hours per day, was special interest legislation. But if so, both 
houses of the New York legislature were thoroughly captured. The 
vote in the lower house was 120 to 0 and in the upper house 20 to 0. 
Kens suggests that perhaps the legislators knew of the statute's 
health provisions but were unaware of the maximum hours regula-
tions. But this seems most unlikely; the statute is only a little over a 
page long, and the very first section opens with the words, "No em-
ployee shall be required, permitted or suffered to work in a biscuit, 
bread or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than 
sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one 
day." The health regulations all appear in subsequent sections. At 
least some of the 140 legislators must have glanced at the opening 
paragraph of the bill they were about to vote on. 
Kens's book contains a disappointing discussion of other as-
pects of the Lochner era. The discussion of judicial decisions is 
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much too simple and pedantic. Most of the intellectual and eco-
nomic history is a heavily derivative, orthodox Progressive critique. 
For example, Kens attributes the substantive due process Justices' 
anti-statist beliefs to Social Darwinism, not dealing with more re-
cent scholarship suggesting first that Social Darwinism was not as 
ubiquitous a political philosophy as we once thought, and secondly 
that not only were the Justices not Social Darwinists, most may not 
have been Darwinians at all. Kens also overstates the rigidity of the 
substantive due process Justices and does not give them sufficient 
credit for their great creativity-whatever else it was, Lochner v. 
New York was a highly creative piece of constitutional non-interpre-
tivism. Kens's epilogue includes a quick survey of substantive due 
process scholarship in the 1980s, but this literature is not well-in-
corporated into the balance of the text. 
Kens concludes by observing that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt wanted to obtain support for his New Deal by putting an 
end to the judicial activism represented by Lochner and its progeny. 
But his own Court turned out to be far more willing to support the 
New Deal than to end judicial activism. Many of Roosevelt's ap-
pointees became enthusiastic supporters of the new wave of activism 
that began a generation later. In that respect, as many of the essays 
in the Paul & Dickman book suggest, the clock may never again be 
turned back. Judges, it seems, are inevitably super-legislators, and 
economic ideologies are their political parties. 
AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM OF 
TEXAS PRISONS. By Ben M. Crouch1 and James W. Mar-
quart.2 University of Texas Press. 1989. Pp. 304. Cloth, 
$27.50. 
David A. Ward 3 
This book reports the product of one of those rare occasions 
when researchers happen to be on site gathering data before a major 
change in policy and practice is imposed on an organization. One 
of the authors, Professor Ben Crouch, began a series of studies of 
Texas prison officers in 1973, worked briefly as a uniformed officer 
himself, and conducted additional studies during 1979 with the 
other author, Professor James Marquart, who also worked as a uni-
I. Professor of Sociology, Texas A. & M. University. 
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